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Abstract:  
Despite much commentary in the media and the popular assumption that the banking industry 
exerts undue influence on government policy-making, the academic literature on the role of the 
banks since the 2008 financial crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In 
particular, we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favorable 
policy outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of regulatory capture. In short, we still 
know relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and in different national contexts, 
the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks 
are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. This article has three 
objectives: 1) to explain why the debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of 
bank influence since the international financial crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools 
for thinking about bank power. 
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Introduction: Why the debate on bank influence matters 
 
This special issue arose from a shared interest and concern about the influence of the largest banks 
in government policy making in western liberal democracies. The international financial crisis and 
the recent scandals concerning the fraudulent manipulation of interest rates by several banks in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and elsewhere have fuelled an intense debate about the “power” of the 
financial industry in the policy process. Despite much commentary in the media1 and the popular 
assumption that the banking industry exerts undue influence,2 the academic literature on the role 
of the banks since the crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In particular, 
we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favourable policy 
outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of industry capture. In short, we still know 
relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and between different national contexts, 
the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks 
are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. The aim of this special issue is 
to shed important new light on the role and influence of the banking industry over the past decade. 
																																																						
1 See, for example, Wolf (2008); Wolf (2012). 
2 Cohan (2011); Johnson and Kwak (2010). 
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This introduction has three objectives, around which the article is structured: 1) to explain why the 
debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of bank influence since the financial 
crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools for thinking about bank power.  
 
We argue that there are three main reasons to focus on bank influence on government policy 
making: one is the role that banks played in the lead up to the financial crisis; the second concerns 
the economic and social costs of the crisis; whilst the third concerns the theoretical claim that big 
firms have the potential to disrupt effective market competition and democratic politics. The first 
reason for our interest in bank influence is that we broadly subscribe to the view that banks played 
a major role in causing the 2007-08 financial crisis. The most immediate objection to this claim is 
that whilst large banks may have disproportionately benefitted from the regulatory and 
macroeconomic conditions prior to the financial crisis, this benefit was fortuitous rather than 
deliberate. Instead we begin this contribution with the premise that the financial crisis of 2007-08 
was not simply the product of failures in abstract economic ideas or technical regulatory rules. 
Many accounts of the crisis focus on inadequate risk management systems, accounting practices, 
or neoliberal doctrine that led regulators to pursue arms-length, light-touch approaches towards 
the largest financial institutions.3 Instead, other accounts — including those represented in this 
special issue — argue that greater attention needs to be paid to the influence of the banking 
industry. In particular, there is overwhelming evidence of insufficient isolation of political 
authorities charged with designing financial regulation from the companies they were meant to be 
regulating — notably banks.4  
 
The conflicts of interest arising for politicians can be interpreted in a variety of ways: as a 
consequence of the revolving door between public and private institutions;5 the result of regulatory 
or intellectual capture;6 or stemming from the structural role played by financial institutions in 
advanced western economies.7 Regardless of these differences, what is clear, we argue, is that 
democratic and regulatory institutions and rules were distorted by the influence of banking 
interests. The (relative) autonomy of political authorities in relation to private corporations, that is 
required to promote healthy market competition under liberal capitalism, was undermined. One 
overarching aim of this special issue is therefore to examine whether the degree of bank influence 
has changed in the decade since the financial crisis.  
 
A second reason why bank influence is an important topic for analysis is because of the massive 
costs of the financial crisis in a number of western liberal democracies. Some estimates suggest 
that combining the two components of the United States (US) administration’s response to the 
crisis — those linked to fiscal policy and those related to financial market policies, such as TARP, 
bank stress tests, and quantitative easing — approximately $1trillion (or 7% of US GDP) was spent 
on fiscal stimulus, and that the TARP alone had a headline price-tag of $700bn.8 Beyond the US, 
OECD estimates point to a 3% of GDP loss in output across all OECD countries, although the 
median fall in output across the 19 OECD countries that were impacted directly by the banking 
																																																						
3 Skidelsky (2009). 
4 See Johnson and Kwak (2010). 
5 Seabrooke and Tsingou (2009). 
6 Stigler (1971); Barth et al. (2012); Claessens et al. (2008). 
7 Ingham (1984). 
8 Blinder and Zandi (2010), 2. 
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crisis is actually closer to 6%.9 Back in the US, studies have concluded that this decline in GDP 
translates into a loss in lifetime earnings of around $70,000 for every American citizen.10  
 
In Europe, the initial costs were arguably lower but the malaise and economic slowdown prompted 
by the crisis of public finances exacerbated by the banking crisis has been longer and deeper. The 
cost of bailing out British banks was closer to $137bn, much smaller than the US bailout packages. 
But one result of this was that British banks — and the British economy — was much slower to 
recover.11 The larger US bailouts that were imposed on the industry helped the banks — and the 
economy — recover faster. Nonetheless, the crisis in US public finances and slowed output 
brought about the worst decade in real wage growth in almost 210 years.12  Whilst throughout 
much of continental Europe the banking and eurozone sovereign debt crises and the collapse in 
output resulted in a number of pressing macro- and micro-economic difficulties: inter alia, 
increased public and private indebtedness; higher unemployment and depressed earnings; and a 
financial sector with an increasing cost of credit and hence less profitable investment projects to 
fund.13 
 
These are the obvious, tangible costs of the international financial crisis. But we argue, thirdly, that 
there are also the outcomes — at least in part — of the overweening power of banks. This is a 
controversial claim that needs to be unpacked both empirically and conceptually. Empirically, a 
range of studies of the pre-crisis period support this conclusion.14 Conceptually however, our claim 
about bank influence implies that the financial crisis was not simply the result of a benign “business 
and investment cycle” within the economy. Instead, a wide variety of intellectual positions have 
emphasised the negative impact of the influence of large financial corporations on both democracy 
and the market mechanism. In fact, this emphasis is closer to the original liberal writings of Adam 
Smith on monopolies; the rent-seeking arguments of John Maynard Keynes; or the 
instrumentalism of Marxist approaches. The concern over the distortive impact of large firms is 
perhaps most aptly described by the German ordo-liberals.15  
 
In the view of the ordo-liberals, “competition is indispensable as an instrument of social 
organisation.”16 Competition takes two forms: it is a mechanism for promoting the continual 
inducement of maximum performance on the part of both workers and capitalists; and it is a device 
for regulating and ordering the economic process, that is, governing supply and demand.17 Put 
differently, ordo-liberals were firm believers in the capacity of the unobstructed price mechanism 
to regulate among multifarious individual preferences.18 Yet competition was also a “category of 
disunity and strife, self-interest and greed, abuse and coercion.”19  Managing the market economy 
																																																						
9 Turner and Ollivaud (2019). 
10 BLS (2018). 
11 Macartney (2019), 170. 
12 Financial Times (2016). 
13 Jimeno (2015), 6. 
14 For example, Engelen et al. (2012); Helleiner et al. (2010); Quaglia (2008); McKeen-Edwards and Porter (2013); 
Mügge (2010). 
15 Here we refer to the German economic tradition of ordo-liberalism associated with the Freiberg School in the 
1920s-30s, the ideas of which became synonymous with the ‘social market economy’. 
16 Muller-Armack (1978), 326. 
17 Ropke (1957), 95. 
18 Muller-Armack (1978), 327. 
19 Bonefeld (2017), chapter 2. 
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is therefore a matter for the state. Imposing order and rules is the function of government. “Changes 
in the law could make firms liable for some of the “disbenefits” they cause. Discrepancies between 
private costs and the spillover costs imposed on others can be corrected” by the state.20  
 
In other words, large firms had both the incentive and the potential to disrupt the market 
mechanism by seeking special privileges from policymakers. They also sought to avoid bearing 
the costs associated with the adjustment to full competition. And the very means by which they 
would seek to shift these burdens onto other interest groups —both other firms and other elements 
of civil society — was via the state apparatus itself.  
 
Put differently, we argue that two central features of countries that experienced the worst banking 
crises in 2007-08 are in large measure explained by the bank influence hypothesis: the fact that the 
largest US and EU-headquartered banks achieved favourable terms prior to the financial crisis was 
not fortuitous, but the result of their manipulation of the political process; and the fact these 
favourable conditions and the deferential approach of state managers helped to fuel — rather than 
rein in — the excessive behavior that culminated in financial instability. What the ordo-liberals 
described as the very function of the state — as market police — was thereby undermined by the 
“power” of the largest banks. This is why, in our estimation, the question of bank influence has 
very serious implications for our understanding of capitalism and democracy in the decade since 
the financial crisis. 
 
 
Evidence of bank influence since the financial crisis 
 
This special issue contributes to a growing literature examining the question of bank power since 
the financial crisis.21 In the second section we therefore briefly examine some of the evidence of 
post-crisis financial regulation over the last decade. The traditional method for analysing business 
power is through its impact on policy outcomes.22 In line with this, we argue that if our goal is to 
identify instances where the interests of the banks have substantively influenced policy-making 
and reform, the evidence is mixed. That is, there are various important examples of instances where 
banks proved to be unsuccessful; whilst there are other important successes.  
 
Of course, using legislative and regulatory outcomes as a proxy for measuring bank influence leads 
to a very narrow focus that may itself be unhelpfully restrictive. But for now, suffice it to note that 
based on this measure there certainly appear to be a variety of instances of banks directing and 
limiting the reform process. Likewise, there also appear to strong examples of failure of the 
assertion of bank influence. We provide here a brief overview to support the claim that there have 
been both successes and failures in banks efforts to influence policy over the past decade, while 
the articles in this special issue provide more detail on some important examples. 
 
Bank bonuses — and bankers’ remuneration more generally — are an important case of bank 
influence because they proved to be one of the most contentious and politically salient issues 
																																																						
20 Brittan (1989), 50. 
21 For example, Bell and Hindmoor (2015, 2017); Culpepper and Reinke (2014); Howarth and Quaglia (2013, 2016); 
James (2018); James and Quaglia (2020); Newman and Posner (2018); Pagliari and Young (2014); Woll (2014). 
22 Culpepper (2015). 
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following the financial crisis. In the US, despite their inclusion in the original Dodd-Frank Act, 
five years later the Obama administration had failed to make any significant progress on reducing 
the overall level of bankers’ remuneration.23 Instead, changes were limited to deferral — delaying 
the bonus — and revisions to the structure of the remuneration; both of which were intended to 
limit the short-termist tendencies. It was widely recognised that these relatively meagre reforms 
were a direct product of successful bank lobbying.24 On the other hand, in Europe, the bonus cap 
directly challenged the preferences of the larger banks by imposing a limit on the actual level of 
the pay-out itself.25  
 
But this difference in remuneration policy adopted should not be read as simply indicative of either 
a lighter-touch approach by US authorities or successes of the US banking lobby in all areas. In 
the area of bank structural reform for example, a central feature of the Dodd Frank act was the so-
called Volcker rule which prohibited proprietary trading — trading with their own capital solely 
for their own profit — for US banks. This was also a significant and contentious issue because it 
also placed much stricter requirements and a higher burden of proof on US banks’ other “market-
making” — customer-serving — trading activity. On the other hand, attempts at similar pan-
European reforms in the shape of the Liikanen proposals were effectively vetoed by a coalition of 
the largest banks and national authorities.26  
 
Tough financial penalties imposed on the largest banks are a third example of a highly contentious 
and politically salient response by, in particular, US and UK authorities. Several accounts point to 
the fines as evidence of a stricter, more nationalistic approach by US state managers towards both 
their domestic and foreign banks.27 Yet other recent accounts have challenged this, arguing that 
bank lobbying influenced the terms of the penalties so that they were much less punitive in reality 
that they might have appeared at face value.28 As with many examples of post-crisis measures, the 
devil is often in the detail; and it would appear that banks lobbied quite effectively for more lenient 
terms attached to the fines.  
 
Major new pieces of European and international regulation such as MiFID II and Basel III also 
appear to have been motivated by a much stricter political approach to banks. MiFID II imposes 
significant constraints on research and fees structures for banks as well as demanding that certain 
types of activity be conducted on more transparent limit-order or electronic exchanges; these 
changes arguably undermine important and lucrative banking strategies in areas such as corporate 
bond trading and fixed income activities. Similar conclusions have been drawn concerning Basel 
III and the limits placed on banks’ inventory of bonds so that the new legislation poses a significant 
threat to the business models of the largest global banks.29 On the other hand, some accounts have 
argued that the more recent dilution of Basel’s trading book requirements and the watering down 
of capital requirements in the EU context provide evidence of renewed back to power and 
influence.30 
																																																						
23 Wall Street Journal (2017) 
24 Zeigler and Woolley (2016). 
25 Andrés et al. (2019). 
26 Howarth and James (2020), Hardie and Macartney (2016). 
27 Emmenegger (2015). 
28 Macartney and Calcagno (2019); Campbell-Verduyn (2017). 
29 Howarth and Quaglia (2013) 
30 Howarth and Quaglia (2016). 
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Finally, in other jurisdictions, the evidence of political support for new challenger banks and 
fintech firms arguably also suggests an existential threat to more established banks. In the UK, for 
example, the Treasury and the Competition and Markets Authority turned to fintech and Open 
Banking to resolve the investment gap and improve output in the real economy. The view of the 
Conservative-led government was that the larger established banks were failing in their role of 
lending to small and medium sized enterprises — the lifeblood of the economy. Fintech firms — 
in the shape of Peer-to-Peer lenders and digital-led challenger banks — were perceived to be the 
solution. The result was a massive increase in new banking licenses and an increase in market 
share for these alternative lending platforms. In other European countries though, as Massoc 
argues,31 policymakers chose to defend their largest banks against the threat of greater domestic 
competition.  
 
What conclusions are we to draw from this brief overview of the post-crisis reform record? Put 
simply, it appears that on some occasions banks achieved their desired policy outcomes whilst on 
other occasions they did not. At this general level of analysis the evidence is however, extremely 
opaque. Inter- and intra-national, as well as intra-industry differences are unclear. Banks in one 
national or regional jurisdiction clearly did not want the same policy outcome; nor did 
policymakers. What then were the mechanisms determining the successes and failures of bank 
influence? The understanding of competing preferences and the mechanisms through which bank 
influence was assured or reduced requires close empirical investigation. Such investigations are 
shaped however — more or less explicitly — by conceptualizations of how capitalism and 
democracy, firms and governments, and ideas and institutions interact. This leads us to the third 
objective of this contribution. 
 
 
Conceptualizing bank power 
 
Our aim in this section of the paper is to embed the discussions about bank power in a series of 
conceptual debates about the power and influence of businesses more broadly and banks in 
particular. As above, these conceptual debates are intended to provide some basis for answering 
the question as to why the record of bank influence since the international financial crisis has been 
so mixed. In particular, we aim to provide various ways of understanding the power of banks in 
shaping public policy outcomes in the past decade. 
 
With their origins in the work of Lindblom and Block, theories of business power suggest that 
corporate influence comes from two main sources:32 one is the direct, instrumental power of firms; 
the other focuses on the structural power they possess. Direct, relational power refers to those 
“non-core functions of the firm on which business relies to attain a political edge”, such as 
campaign donations or lobbying.33 Structural power refers to the fact that business control the 
investment decisions on which the economy depends for growth.34 Variation in business power 
																																																						
31 Massoc (2020). 
32 Lindblom (1977); Block (1987). 
33 Culpepper (2015), 396. 
34 See Quinn and Shapiro (1991); Swank (1992); Przeworksi and Wallerstein (1988). 
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over time and place derives from how these critical sources of power are mediated by both 
institutions and ideas.35 We review this literature in the following four subsections. 
 
Banks are not a privileged group 
On the first, the most substantive criticism of business power in general, and bank power more 
specifically, is that they do not in fact hold a privileged position. This line of criticism is a direct 
response to the structural view. It springs from a number of observations: the first is that structural 
theories fail to account for the ubiquitous nature of business lobbying. If policymakers are so 
readily willing to adjust policies to suit business interests, why do businesses invest so much time 
and money in lobbying?36 The second criticism is that businesses do not always win.37 Often policy 
reform directly conflicts with the interest of business groups.38 One conclusion is, therefore, that 
business is an interest group like any other, neither inherently advantaged or disadvantaged in 
pursuing its interests. Criticisms have also focused on how we measure business influence: one of 
the main criticisms of structural approaches is that unless we use policy outcomes as a measure of 
the success or failure — the influence — of business, it is hard to trace the causal effect of structural 
power. Furthermore, since policy outcomes remain the main metric — dependent variable — 
available to political scientists, the ability to distinguish between the causal effect of structural and 
instrumental power is limited by problems of observational equivalence.  
 
In relation to our puzzle about the apparent successes and failures of bank lobbying, the answer 
from this perspective is therefore relatively straightforward: accounts that emphasise the non-
privileged position of business argue that there have been successes and failures because this is 
what we would expect to find. Banks are simply an interest group like any other. Although banks 
may be well-resourced, the nature of policy-making in pluralist democracies would indicate that 
compromises are the most likely outcome as their interests must be balanced against those of other 
(often latent) groups, such as consumers and taxpayers. 
 
Banks were temporarily disoriented 
Secondly, in direct contrast to the previous pluralist account are a range of arguments emphasising 
the structural power of business in general and, in our case, the banks. As Dahl and Lindblom 
argued, “common interpretations that depict the American or any other market-oriented system as 
a competition among interest groups are seriously in error for their failure to take account of the 
distinctive privileged position of businessmen in politics.”39 According to Marsh and Lewis: “for 
Lindblom, a, perhaps the, major role of government is to encourage businessmen to invest and 
produce; thus increasing GDP and improving everyone’s standard of living.”40 This gives business 
a structural power, with a coercive and ideological dimension, because governments must 
“anticipate and defer” to business demands.41   
 
																																																						
35 For example, see Culpepper (2015) and Bell and Hindmoor (2015, 2017). 
36 Smith (2000). 
37 Vogel (1989). 
38 Bernhagen (2007). 
39 Dahl and Lindblom (1976), xxxvi. 
40 Marsh and Lewis (2014), 628. 
41 Lindblom (1982), 325; see also Hall (1986); Quinn and Shapiro (1991); Swank (1992); Andrews (1994); 
Przeworksi and Wallerstein (1988); Strange (1998). 
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In relation to our problematique, the argument is that the largest banks do indeed possess a 
structural power, but that — in answer to the question of bank success or failure — this power has 
waxed and waned over the past decade. The US and most EU national banking systems have been 
in a state of flux for a number of years. Here we briefly outline two interrelated considerations 
which may have affected banks’ structural power: the macroeconomic environment; and the “real” 
source of bank power.   
 
Quite aside from the impact of political and regulatory initiatives, the macroeconomic environment 
of the past decade has had a significant impact on the revenue and profit margins and operations 
of the largest banks. In particular, the profitability of specific business strategies and the overall 
firm has shown considerable variation. Loose monetary policy — low interest rates and 
Quantitative Easing in the US, UK and eurozone — has played a particularly significant role. The 
orthodox view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism suggests that this accommodative 
(so-called “extraordinary”) monetary policy should translate into increased bank lending to the 
economy. Yet it is also widely recognised that loose monetary policy has historically been one of 
the main drivers of non-interest income in the banks, precisely because it places downward 
pressures on revenue from traditional (interest-based) lending activities. As Haldane et al. 
conclude, low yields on safe assets and slow returns from sluggish economic recovery, combined 
with excess liquidity — provided by accommodative monetary policy — “encouraged investors 
to put money into riskier asset classes.”42 In other words, bank business models have been 
challenged and have been in a state of flux, partly as a result of macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Furthermore, loose monetary policy has also decimated other areas of profitability for the largest 
banks, and left them in a vulnerable competitive position in relation to asset management firms 
and newer fintechs. For example, in the area of corporate bond trading, business that was 
previously dominated by the largest dealer-banks, loose monetary policy appears to have 
disempowered the banks. Low interest rates led to a glut of new corporate borrowing. But lower 
interest rates have also meant lower returns on the debt provided by the banks in the corporate 
bond markets. This is because when interest rates fall, for example, older bonds become more 
valuable because they were sold in a higher interest rate environment and hence have higher 
coupons.43 Looser monetary policy would therefore traditionally have required (and actively 
encouraged) Wall Street dealer-banks to take additional risks in corporate bond markets. As we 
noted above though, as a result of new Basel III trading book rules and the Volcker clause in Dodd-
Frank, banks were limited in their capacity to hold large inventories of bonds. Instead, newer 
fintech firms gained market share — at the expense of the larger established banks — because of 
their ability to price and execute more competitively than the regulation-affected banks.  
 
The macroeconomic environment has therefore been an important factor explaining the 
profitability or weakness of particular banks and banking systems. Here there are noticeable 
differences between the impact upon European and North American banks. Whilst the trend for 
European banks has been towards slow progress and downsizing, Wall Street banks have grown 
and expanded significantly in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Indeed, the conclusion of some 
commentators was that by 2018 Wall Street banks had established a “seemingly unshakeable 
																																																						
42 Haldane et al. (2016), 8. 
43 PIMCO (2018). 
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dominance in global corporate and investment banking.”44 Cost-cutting and more conservative 
risk-taking initially characterised the Wall Street response — as was the case in Europe: in 2008-
10 the aim was “to reduce the balance sheet and simplify the organisation;”45 a “smaller and more 
humble financial services industry”46 was the message. But by 2015 a combination of an upturn in 
the credit cycle and US economic recovery had led to heightened credit risk47 and a return to riskier 
asset classes.  
 
These macroeconomic conditions might go some way to explaining the mixed record of bank 
influence over the last decade. Banks struggling to adapt and streamline may have found it 
increasingly challenging to exert themselves in the political domain. If this is the case, greater 
sensitivity to the conditions affecting banks might serve to vindicate the structural power view of 
some academics. 
 
We imply above that the macroeconomic environment placed many banks on the back foot. This 
would certainly go some way to explain bank losses and failures to exert influence over the last 
decade. But what of the successes? What does the structural account have to offer here? Simply 
put, the argument of some approaches to bank power is that banks still possess a structural 
influence that is also not just reducible to their role as credit or investment providers. It goes 
without saying that banks are not the only — or even perhaps the most important — firms that 
lend to the domestic economy. This is why the question of the sources of bank influence is crucial. 
As Vogel argued, the “sources of business strength are either exclusively or disproportionately 
available to capitalists;”48 but these sources are not limited to investment decisions.  
 
Arguably, the main source of bank power as the financial crisis hit stemmed from their Too Big 
To Fail (TBTF) status. This, in turn, had its origins in the system of deposit guarantees afforded 
large universal banks.49 Government protection comes in three forms: liquidity insurance 
(protecting wholesale deposits), deposit insurance (protecting retail deposits), and capital 
insurance (protecting shareholder equity).50 Liquidity insurance dates back to the early nineteenth 
century, but deposit insurance and capital insurance have a shorter history, emerging after the great 
depression.51 They were initially put to the test in 1982, when one of the largest American 
commercial lenders, Continental Illinois National bank and trust Company (CINB) collapsed and 
was subsequently bailed out, with US regulators significantly expanding the customer deposits 
they were willing to insure. The ensuing debate centred on whether large banks had to be treated 
differently to smaller institutions.52 The decision was made that they should be. But the result not 
only boosted the share prices — of the largest firms because of their implicit guarantee — but also 
reduced their funding costs, giving them a significant competitive advantage.53 The point is that 
																																																						
44 Financial Times (2018). 
45 Citigroup (2008), 8. 
46 Bank of America (2008), 3. 
47 OCC (2016), 3. 
48 Vogel (1996), 300. 
49 Steern and Feldman (2004), 11. 
50 Alessandri and Haldane (2009), 3. 
51 Macartney (2019), 39. 
52 FDIC (1987), 112. 
53 Alessandri and Haldane (2010). 
	 10	
the expectation of state support has been shown to make share and bond prices, as well as the cost 
of debt for these largest banks, less sensitive to risk.54 
 
These details are vitally important for two reasons. First, despite the significant changes to bailout 
structures and the new or revised resolution regimes adopted in the US and EU designed to allow 
banks to be closed down, it is not at all clear that this source of bank power — size — and the 
competitive advantage it affords them has been resolved. This also means, secondly, that although 
political authorities have made various attempts either to promote greater competition in the 
provision of investment/credit or drive forward measures like the EU Capital Markets Union to 
diversify and deepen financial markets55 — intended, in part, to decrease real economy reliance 
upon the largest banks — these same banks arguably continue to hold their TBTF status combined, 
in many instances, with that of national champion. According to some accounts, the sources of 
financial power — the advantages of the largest banks — are arguably disproportionate and 
significantly different from the sources of power in other industries. Put differently, it is not 
sufficient to dismiss the structural argument on the basis of doubts about the “threat of 
disinvestment;” bank structural power might emanate from a range of other sources, such as TBTF, 
which continue to exert an influence on democratic politics.  
 
Banks may also assert structural power in more subtle ways. For an incumbent government, the 
prospect of certain types of private investment – and the potential threat of disinvestment – rely 
not on explicit threats, but more on the perceptions of policy makers and the discursive 
construction of business “power” by industry lobbyists.56 In this sense, an important source of 
structural power for banks may be the inherently uncertain and unpredictable quality of financial 
markets, which serves as a powerful constraint on regulators’ scope of action. In a novel 
contribution to this special issue, Bart Stellinga argues that it is indeed the complex and “reflexive” 
qualities of financial markets that have hampered key post-crisis reforms: notably, the 
implementation of macroprudential policies aimed at mitigating systemic risks.57 In particular, he 
suggests that the weakness of macroprudential policy recommendations in international and EU 
level fora owes to the inherent difficulties facing regulatory authorities in seeking to identify and 
measure the build-up of systemic risk. Therefore, the intractability of systemic risk — and not 
bank influence per se — significantly weakened the capacity of regulators to change bank 
behaviour. 
 
The mediating role of ideas and institutions 
A third range of academic explanations for the success or failure of back efforts to influence 
government policy emphasize how business power is mediated by ideas and institutions. This adds 
a further dimension to both the structural and the instrumental explanations of bank influence by 
emphasising the particular political dynamics within which banks have sought to exercise their 
influence. To misuse Mark Blyth’s adage, economic events and processes do not come with an 
																																																						
54 Lindh and Schich (2012), Hau et al. (2013), O’Hara and Shaw (1990), Morgan and Stiroh (2005), Balasubramnian 
and Cyree (2011), Acharya et al. (2014). 
55 Quaglia and Howarth (2018). 
56 Hay and Rosamond (2002). 
57 Stellinga (2020); see also Stellinga and Mügge (2017). 
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instruction manual:58 they are interpreted and narrated; and this relies on both the inter-subjective 
understandings of political elites and the competing narratives of particular interest groups.59  
 
Culpepper develops this line of thought more systematically, by emphasising issue salience and 
institutional governance as two vital factors that shape the effectiveness of business agency.60 
When issues are off the public radar (low salience) business can rely on the “quiet politics” of 
access to government. Here government is more likely to defer to corporate interests because non-
business groups are less active and the issues themselves can be delegated to more informal 
institutions. On the other hand, as salience increases, non-business groups become more active, 
seeking to challenge business influence; as a result, governments are often forced to escalate issues 
to more visible and transparent arenas in order to secure greater legitimation.61 In his article for 
this special issue, Giuseppe Montalbano argues that, at the agenda-setting stage, large financial 
institutions — notably banks — established a policy coalition with the European Central Bank, 
the Bank of England, and the EU Commission which proved to be relatively effective. However, 
as the political saliency of reforms increased further into the legislative process, the financial 
industry coalition proved to be slightly less effective. A focus on salience more generally has the 
benefit of overcoming some of the criticisms of structural versus instrumental accounts. Culpepper 
and Reinke argue that the sources of business power (structural versus instrumental) are not the 
only decisive variables;62 how these resources are mobilised (automatically or strategically) is also 
very significant. In this way, we can see that structural power often has to be asserted strategically 
in order to be effective in a specific policy domain. 
 
This supports the findings of David Howarth and Scott James who, in their article for this special 
issue, argue that the reason for the UK Conservative-led government pursuing the toughest bank 
structural reforms — ring-fencing — in Europe despite the Conservative party’s traditionally 
deferential approach towards the City and the largest banks was a matter of political timing.63 The 
right confluence of ideas, institutions, popular pressure, and activities of the banks in question gave 
rise to a stringent set of reforms. Other studies also highlight the strengthening of state capacity 
and powerful ideational narratives as factors that have curtailed the instrumental influence of 
financial lobbyists64 and limited the credibility of threats to disinvest from a particular country.65 
In his article for this special issue, Mehmet Kerem Coban argues that the strength of the Turkish 
regulator — its regulatory capacity — was significantly greater than the banking sector’s “capture 
capacity.”66 Both banks and regulators in Turkey faced pressures to be seen to be complying with 
international standards; but bankers were much more sceptical as to Basel III requirements, arguing 
that they were too restrictive for a developing country like Turkey. Yet regulatory authorities 
succeeded in limiting bank influence through a policy-making process that restricts private sector 
access. Furthermore, in her article for this special issue, Elsa Massoc argues that the important 
explanatory factor of very different bank structural reforms adopted in the UK, France and German 
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was not the relative strength or weakness of the banking lobby in the three countries.67 Rather, she 
emphasizes the relative power of anti-Too-Big-To-Fail factions in domestic politics and the 
institutional capacity of agents that were less deferential to the large banks to influence the 
policymaking process. 
 
Other papers in this special issue speak to the important mediating role of political institutions. In 
his contribution, Jo Ganderson focuses upon the relevance of institutional democratic variables — 
and notably majoritarian versus consensus party systems — in shaping the influence of banks over 
government policymaking on financial regulation.68 In particular, he argues that structural 
separation of banks in the UK was a product of adversarial party competition which challenged 
the power of industry; by contrast, the dynamics of power sharing and consensus in the Netherlands 
enabled the bank lobby to redirect reform efforts towards less threatening initiatives targeting bank 
culture. The article by David Coen and John-Paul Salter point to additional institutional features 
to explain the relationship of banks and regulatory agencies.69 They argue that the decision of 
banks to forge a close relationship with a particular regulatory agency depends on three factors: 
the agency’s credibility, its legitimacy, and its transparency. They conclude that the connections 
between the European Banking Authority (EBA) and banks are still in their infancy and that banks 
have been discouraged to improve relations because of the EBA’s problematic legitimacy — 
especially in comparison with a number of national authorities — and lack of transparency.  
 
Beyond the specific contributions to this special issue, the ideational-institutional account also 
highlights that waning political willpower and a change of government can also work to re-
empower banks or limiting the reform agenda. The dismissal of Martin Wheatley — the vocal 
critic of the banks who lead the UK Financial Conduct Authority — is a case in point. His departure 
was emblematic of the new Conservative government’s softer approach to the City in 2016. 
Similarly, Richard Cordray, the hard-line head of the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
resigned in response to the more lenient approach of the Trump administration regarding banks.70 
Indeed, the Trump administration brought with it promises of relaxing the more stringent parts of 
the US Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.71 Further, in its first months, 
the Trump Presidency appointed former Goldman Sachs grandees to assist the more sympathetic 
approach towards banks. At any rate, both the successes and failures of the banks can be explained 
with reference to the ideas and institutions within which political struggles have occurred.  
 
Banks are not unified 
The fourth explanation for the successes and failures of the banking sector since the financial crisis 
is that the cohesiveness and homogeneity of bank lobbying should not be taken for granted. 
Individual national case studies had earlier cautioned against overemphasising the unity of 
corporations in influencing government policy.72 In the UK, for example, it was widely recognised 
that small businesses had struggled to act collectively; historically this was in sharp contrast with 
financial trade associations and the banking sector in the UK.73 But more recent studies have also 
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problematized cohesion among different elements of the financial sector.74 In other words, “sharp 
divisions… among different parts of the private finance sector” can have significant detrimental 
effects on their lobbying power.75 In their article for this special issue, Howarth and James point 
to major divisions in national banking sectors as one factor explaining the weakness of bank 
influence in the UK on structural reform.76 Furthermore, in his article, Giuseppe Montalbano 
points to alliances between specific large banks and other supportive financial firms seeking to 
encourage the EU’s efforts to promote securitization half a decade after the financial crisis had 
sorely damaged the reputation of this financial technique.77 
 
These accounts depart from the a priori assumption that large global banks, even those sharing the 
same home country, have shared preferences. Instead, the assumption is that preferences are more 
likely to diverge, which poses problems for exerting influence over government policy. Some of 
these accounts — including the article for this special issue by Adam Chalmers and Kevin Young 
— emphasise “socialization networks” that form between industry actors and how shared 
preferences emerge from the proximity of these relationships between private firms.78 The 
conclusion, with regard to our puzzle about the successes and failures of bank efforts to influence 
government policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis, would be that financial actors were more 
likely to be successful when they had closer, network-like, connections with other financial agents. 
These networks would in turn have promoted a convergence of interests and also the potential to 
act collectively in a more assertive way. Chalmers and Young find evidence that organizations’ 
preferences are informed by their location within socialization networks. Controlling for a range 
of other plausible factors, the authors find that those connected via common associational ties, 
those closer to one another in the network and those more “embedded” in this network are all less 
likely to diverge in terms of their preferences from one another.  
 
Critical approaches to the state 
Returning to our central question about how to explain the mixed record of the banking industry 
in shaping government policy since the financial crisis, a fifth set of “critical political economy” 
accounts depart from some of the institutionalist and rationalist assumptions mapped out above. 
Instead they have their origins in the Marxist accounts of Poulantzas, Offe, and Habermas. Rather 
than emphasising either the instrumental (lobbying) power of capital (corporations), or verging on 
the equally problematic Marxist version of structuralism — that business almost always gets its 
way because the state is simply the executive committee of the capitalist class — these accounts 
argue that there is nonetheless a structural bias within the state.79 The result is that the state is not 
in itself a neutral instance, but is preoccupied with reconciling two often contradictory priorities: 
securing the conditions for sustainable accumulation and maintaining the legitimacy of the 
particular capitalist order.80 
 
These “critical political economy” accounts may have certain merits when applied to the bank 
power debate following the financial crisis. In particular, they help to make sense of the apparent 
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conflict between the rhetoric and the reality of a variety of reforms. In many areas — inter alia, 
the financial penalties imposed upon banks, bank levies, lending targets, and the public 
interrogation of bankers by state authorities — the political rhetoric of elected politicians and 
financial regulators depicted an attempt to punish banks and promote a new social contract between 
banks and civil society (Macartney 2014). In reality though, these measures fell a long way short 
and were often disturbingly light-touch. In contrast to some of the accounts summarised above, 
the weakness of these measures may not only have been due to effective bank lobbying or of 
structural threats of bank disinvestment. Rather this weakness may reflect an attempt by state 
managers to deflect criticism and restore credibility (legitimacy) without significantly 
undermining the particular (financialised) variety of capitalism in their respective jurisdictions.81  
 
At the very least, we would argue that if our goal is to ascertain the winners and losers of bank 
reform since 2008, it is important not to dismiss a range of approaches which tackle this question 
from an alternative conceptual point of entry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This introduction has been framed by three objectives. First, we seek to explain why — at both a 
concrete and abstract level — the study of bank influence in western capitalism is extremely 
important. The debates on the relationship between capitalism and democracy have been 
extensively covered and have a long history. But the costs of the financial crisis and the evidence 
of the overweening power of banks encourages fresh examination of this relationship. Our second 
objective is to examine the empirical record since the financial crisis. The range of financial 
reforms is vast. Here we provide a brief overview to support the claim that despite the fact that 
post-crisis reforms were ostensibly intended to rein in the excessive influence and instability of 
the banks, there is also evidence of banks benefitting from and watering down reforms. As the 
articles in this special issue show, there has been significant variation in bank influence over time 
and place. Then, third, we set out a range of conceptual tools to explore the successes and failures 
of the banking industry to shape policy since the crisis. Here we integrate some longstanding 
debates about business power, with more contemporary contributions, whilst also presenting some 
concrete examples of changes — inter alia — in the macroeconomic, political and banking context 
that may help to explain the past decade of reforms.  
 
To end, we reflect briefly on what the past decade of post-crisis financial regulatory reform tells 
us about the likely trajectory of bank influence in the future. As European economies have slowly 
recovered and collective memories of the financial and sovereign debt crises gradually recede, a 
business power account might reasonably expect the power of the financial industry to increase. 
Indeed, as the salience of financial regulation declines, so we might predict the return of a “quiet 
politics” of bank power, heralding a swing in the regulatory pendulum back to a lighter touch 
approach. Indeed, a number of top bank supervisory officials have warned loudly of such a 
development.82 However, we argue that there are at least two grounds for disputing this prediction. 
First, in political terms, the end of the financial crisis has not produced a return to pre-crisis 
normality or predictability. On the contrary, growing dissatisfaction with the economic status quo 
in an era of stagnant wages and inflated asset prices has translated into mounting political distrust 
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and voter anger. As a result, electorates have become increasingly polarised and election outcomes 
have become increasingly volatile — particularly in those countries that experienced the greatest 
economic turmoil over the past decade. Hence, far from heralding a return to the “quiet politics” 
of bank influence, we have seen the financial industry repeatedly buffeted by an increasingly 
“noisy” post-crisis politics. 
 
Second, this new politics has witnessed the rise of “populist” parties, leaders and policies — 
notably in the form of President Trump in the US and the Brexit referendum vote in the UK. 
Intriguingly, despite both political developments occurring at a time when the centre-right is in 
power, the implications for the banking sector have been decidedly mixed. On the one hand, 
Trump’s election has paved the way for a significant rolling back of the Dodd-Frank financial 
regulatory reforms, particularly with regard to the implementation and applicability of the Volcker 
Rule. Yet Wall Street remains nervous about the unpredictability of the Trump administration, 
particularly with respect to its attempt to clamp down on the US financial industry’s links with 
China.83 On the other hand, Brexit risks seriously undermining the City of London’s status as 
Europe’s largest international financial centre by erecting new barriers to financial services trade 
between the UK and the EU.84 Surprisingly, from a business power perspective, the UK 
government has sought to prioritise the political imperative of withdrawing from the EU single 
market over the immediate economic concerns — and extensive lobbying — of its own financial 
industry.85 On balance then, the implications of heightened economic uncertainty and political 
instability in this post-crisis period are unpredictable for the banking industry. This points to the 
importance of continuing to refine and develop new theories and analytical perspectives on bank 
power in an era of “hyper-politics”: an intellectual endeavour to which this special issue aims to 
make an important contribution.    
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